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Abstract. Government regulation plays a significant role in the field of heritage conservation. 
Namely, regulation is aimed at controlling the stock of heritage, restricting or modifying the 
activities of public as well as private actors. Surprisingly, the literature has neither extensively 
investigated the performance of the heritage authorities involved in the implementation of 
conservation policies nor its determinants. In this paper we address this issue, from a theoretical as 
well as an empirical perspective, using Sicily as a case study. More precisely, we analyze the 
determinants of the differences in the efficiency levels of conservation activity of the nine Sicilian 
heritage authorities over the period 1993-2005. Economic and managerial variables are used to 
distinguish non-discretionary from discretionary causes. The results show that the efficiency 
scores seem to be only affected by economic factors whereas the managerial variables do not 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Almost everywhere the public sector plays an important role in the conservation of cultural 
heritage, even if with different quantitative and qualitative characteristics. In this field Government 
action can follow various patterns using a mix of different tools such as public spending, tax-
expenditures and regulation.   
The efficiency and effectiveness of heritage conservation policies, i.e. their capability to meet 
citizens’ demand and to score the expected results in terms of ‘public interest’, crucially depends 
on the features of the decision-making process and of the actors involved. A crucial role is plaid by 
heritage authorities, i.e. by those uncharged of implementing conservation policies, because the 
asymmetrical information characterizing the heritage field. Surprisingly, the literature on the 
economics of heritage has not extensively investigated their performance and in this paper we try 
to fill this gap. To fulfill this objective we address this issue, from a theoretical as well as an 
empirical perspective; Sicilian heritage authorities (Soprintendenze) are chosen as a case study to 
analyze the role of the regulator in the heritage field and to devise some policy implications.  
In this paper we extend previous literature on conservation activity, using the production 
function of heritage authorities defined by Finocchiaro Castro and Rizzo (2009) and trying to 
evaluate the determinants of their performance. For this purpose we use the efficiency scores, 
calculated through the application  of Data Envelopment Analysis  method, as dependent variable 
and economic as well as managerial factors as independent variables. The determinants are 
estimated using parametric as well as semi-parametric approaches (Simar and Wilson, 2007).  
The empirical results of our analysis show that Sicilian heritage authorities achieve, on 
average, low efficiency levels that seems to be affected by economic variables (such as the size of 
the regulated territory, per-capita income, level of education, number of buildings built before 
1919) whereas the managerial variables (such as seniority and expertise of the regulator) do not 
affect the performance. Tentative policy implications stemming from our analysis would suggest 
to introduce incentives toward efficiency in the decision-making process and to reshape the  
territorial design of Soprintendenze to reduce their costs of production. 
The analysis develops as follows: we firstly discuss the main economic characteristics of 
Government intervention for conservation in section 2 and, then, in section 3 we describe the 
institutional features of our case study, the Soprintendenze in Sicily. In section 4, the 
methodological issues underlying the measurement of the efficiency of heritage conservation 
authorities are explored, technical efficiency of Sicilian heritage authorities is estimated and the 
empirical analysis of its determinants is presented. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
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II. MAIN FEATURES OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION FOR 
CONSERVATION 
1. Government tools 
In all the industrialized countries the public sector plays an important role in the conservation of 
cultural heritage, even if with different quantitative and qualitative characteristics. The analysis of 
the normative rationale for Government intervention is outside the scope of this paper and the 
related efficiency and equity arguments are taken for granted;1  in what follows the attention will 
be concentrated on the features of  public action and on its effects. In fact, though market failure 
provides a rationale for Government intervention  this is not to say that Government action is 
efficient in providing conservation nor that there is only one way to intervene  (Mazza, 2003).   
In the heritage field, Government uses direct monetary tools – such as expenditure - as well as 
indirectly monetary tools – e.g. tax-expenditures -. At the same time, a major role is played by a 
non monetary instrument such as regulation.  In what follows, attention will be concentrated on 
public spending and regulation.2  
Public expenditure can be used for many purposes: to purchase  goods and services3 as well as 
buildings of artistic interest or to provide subsidies and/or loans to cultural institutions (public, 
private or non profit) or to private owners of historic buildings.  
As Peacock and Rizzo (2008) point out, the size, the composition and the institutional features 
of public spending vary across countries: for instance, state-driven, bureaucratic systems4 prevail 
in France and Italy with a larger role for the public sector and the central government while Anglo-
Saxon countries follow an arms-length approach, with lower direct expenditure and larger private 
support (Ploeg van der, 2006).  Notwithstanding the size of public cultural spending, Government 
plays a very relevant role in the cultural heritage field since non monetary tools, such as 
regulation, which are not accounted for by  statistics, affect the allocation of resources in a relevant 
way.  
Regulation is a non monetary tool aimed at restricting or modifying the activities of public as 
well as private actors in order to control the stock of heritage. Regulation constrains the exercise of 
property rights in many different ways: for instance, listing historical and archaeological sites, as 
well as individual buildings, preventing the demolition of a building or a group of buildings; 
imposing restrictions on the uses to which the building can be put, on its appearance and the way 
                                                
1
 A general  overview of the pros and cons of the normative justifications for government intervention in the 
heritage  field is provided by Peacock and Rizzo (2008).  
2 Tax expenditures, e.g. tax allowances to incentive private financing are not taken into account because they 
are not relevant for our case study since they are outside the influence of Regional government. 
3 For example, the salaries for Government experts and staff involved in heritage conservation, the purchasing 
of consumption goods, equipment for diagnosis, etc. for the restoration activity.  
4 Such a system is state-driven and top-down;  bureaucrats and politicians decide how to distribute public 
funds.  
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restoration or re-use is carried out; imposing limitations on the use of land affecting heritage 
buildings. Regulated subjects must comply and penalties are provided for non compliance.5 
Regulation is a flexible tool, which satisfies the need for quick decisions characterizing the 
heritage field, and at the same time leaves many degrees of freedom to the decision–maker, since 
the concept of heritage is not well defined (Rizzo, 2003).  
2. Focus on conservation 
The principles of cultural heritage conservation internationally recognized have been established 
through time among conservation professionals and may be found in a great number of 
international,6 regional, national, and thematic documents on a variety of topics, such as historic 
towns, training and education, popular architecture etc.  
Different meanings can be assigned to the word ‘conservation’ with different economic 
implications (Peacock and Rizzo, 2008).  In some cases  the concept of conservation aims not only 
at keeping heritage safe from harm but also at enhancing it through a positive change, in other 
cases this latter component is almost absent. Conservation choices can exert relevant economic 
effects because they impinge upon property rights and may also generate a distributional impact. If 
a conservationist stance is adopted and heritage is simply preserved, its full enjoyment and 
utilization might be prevented and, therefore, its potential benefits cannot be fully generated. As 
Rizzo (2002) outlines, restrictions on the use of buildings, their appearance and the way in which 
restoration and re-use is carried out might undermine the possibility of restoring and revitalizing 
historical centers which is usually one objective on the political agenda of local authorities. 
Conservation, therefore, generates costs which  depend on the stance adopted by the regulator: 
apart from the administrative and bureaucratic ones, some of these costs can be foreseen in 
advance because they are closely connected to the conservation (for example, the requirement to 
use special materials, qualified operators, etc. to ensure quality) while others are subject to a high 
degree of uncertainty, as a consequence of an undue ‘conservationist’ approach to the fabric, well 
beyond what is justified by the costs-benefits comparison (Pignataro and Rizzo,1997). At the same 
time,  the indirect costs imposed on any activity that interfere with heritage regulation should not 
be undervalued.  
The above mentioned problems mainly arise when the decision-making process is supply-
oriented, e.g. mainly driven by the preferences of the experts rather than by society and when the 
public decision-maker has no incentives to take into account society’s preferences. Sicily offers a 
good example of the occurrence of the above mentioned problems as it will be outlined in the 
following section.  
                                                
5 In addition to these forms of regulation, which Throsby (1997) defines as hard regulations, there are also 
non-enforceable forms of regulation, i.e. soft regulations, mainly applied at international level: Charters, 
Codes of Practice, Guidelines, etc., as well as listing, such as the Unesco World Heritage List, belong to 
this type of regulation, are implemented by agreement and not involve penalties.   
6 The list of international documents is almost endless ranging from ICOMOS documents, such as the Venice 
Chart (1964) or the Nara Document on Authenticity (1999) to the Unesco Vienna Memorandum on 
Historic Urban Landscapes (2005) or to the 2000 Charter of Krakow (produced by the cooperation of  six 
European countries).  
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III. INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES AND POLICY TOOLS IN SICILIAN 
HERITAGE CONSERVATION 
Sicily is an Italian region which enjoys full autonomy in the field of heritage policy. Political 
decisions about heritage policy are taken by the Regional government while their implementation 
is carried out by nine Heritage Soprintendenze, which are responsible for any decision regarding 
heritage conservation. Their activity offers an interesting case study both for understanding the 
features of Sicilian conservation policy and  for analyzing the role of the regulator in the heritage 
field. 
As it was said before, heritage is a vague and broad concept and, as a consequence, the 
conservation activities of Soprintendenze are discretional, wide-ranging and impinge upon private 
as well as public decisions. In other research,7 it has been pointed out that Soprintendenze are run 
by experts, enjoy great freedom not only because of the choice of instruments and their intensity 
but also because the scope of their activity largely depends on their autonomous evaluation. 
However, the degree of autonomy enjoyed by Soprintendenze is very low at the operational level, 
for example as far as the management of personnel is concerned. 
Following Rizzo (2002), we distinguish two types of Soprintendenze activities: passive 
conservation (PC) and active conservation (AC).   The former pertains to the activity of providing 
rules and of monitoring their implementation, i.e. the regulation activity, for both public and 
private heritage situated in the territory of competence; the latter refers to direct intervention to 
provide conservation, i.e. spending activity.  Such a distinction might be questioned, since PC and 
AC activities may be interconnected in some cases8; while recognizing the significance of these 
links, using such a distinction is useful because it recalls the conventional distinction between 
monetary and non monetary tools (spending and regulation) and, thus, helps to understand the 
complexity of conservation activities from an economic point of view. Moreover, the distinction 
allows for empirical investigation by introducing the possibility of devising indicators for each 
activity. 
1. Passive and active conservation activity 
Passive conservation (PC) activity implies many different administrative acts, enforceable on both 
private and public owners, such as: 
- constraints (limitations on the use of heritage whose strength depends on the type of 
heritage and includes items such as monumental constraints, prohibition of alterations and 
land constraints);  
- demolition orders; 
                                                
7
 See Rizzo (2002, 2003). 
8
 For instance, research and study activities underlying both can be considered interdependent; a discovery 
resulting from an archaeological excavation might call for imposing constraints; at the same time, 
expropriation is prerequisite to direct intervention. 
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- authorizations (consent for carrying out activities such as restoration and rehabilitation of 
heritage);9 
- permission to import and export. 
In some cases, such as authorizations, the above regulatory activity is in response to the 
owner’s demand. In other cases, they can be spontaneous measures to constrain owner’s activity 
(landscape constraints) or punishment for violations (for instance, demolition orders). 
Soprintendenze decisions are taken on the grounds of technical (given that their staff is made up of 
experts) and administrative grounds and are subject to judicial review only if those affected 
dispute the decision in court.  
Active conservation (AC) refers to direct intervention to provide conservation. AC and 
involves a wide array of activities such as taking an inventory, performing scientific research, 
training staff, updating, excavating, and restoring. In other words, AC refers to the activities put in 
practice by Soprintendenze via direct expenditure, mainly through the hiring of external 
contractors to carry out physical operations and draw up contracts.  
The degree of autonomy enjoyed by Soprintendenze is very high at the planning level while 
low at the operational level.10 No autonomy exists as far as the operation of funds is concerned, 
given that any expenditure decision – even within the program – has to be approved at the regional 
level. The only cases in which Soprintendenze enjoy financial freedom is in so-called situations of 
high emergency.  
The Soprintendenze’s expenditures are constrained by the availability of funds. Diagnostic 
activity is usually not feasible on a large scale and, therefore, poor information does exist on the 
health status of heritage. Thus, AC activity cannot be directed where it is most needed, with the 
likely consequence of reducing the overall effectiveness of the allocation of resources in this 
sector. Soprintendenze performance is not adequately monitored at the Regional level nor evidence 
emerges that an incentive system exists (in terms of the size of budget or private benefits for 
bureaucrats, such as career and salary) to induce Soprintendenze to fulfill government objectives, 
however they are defined. As a consequence, conservation would seem to be mainly driven by 
objectives and preferences of the specialists and experts within the Soprintendenze  (Finocchiaro 
Castro and Rizzo, 2009). 
2. Policy Implications 
Having briefly described the aims and tools of regional government policy in the heritage field, we 
turn to the implications of this mixture of functions. In what follows, we will raise some issues for 
further discussion and development and offer few tentative conclusions. 
The first question to address is how each Soprintendenza establishes a trade-off between the 
output it is expected to produce (AC and PC) and its constraints. Such a trade-off is likely to take 
                                                
9
 The strength of this act depends on the type of heritage and the constraint to which it is subject. For 
instance, it is more severe if the constraint refers also to the interior of a listed building and less severe if 
the building is only subject to restrictions on its appearance. 
10 Once the yearly activity program submitted by each Soprintendenza is approved at the regional level, no 
discretionary variation is allowed. 
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into account exogenous constraints as well as preferences determined, among other things, by 
existing incentives.  
Constraints seem to be different in the two cases. As pointed out above, AC measures are 
partially constrained by the availability and timing of financial resources assigned by the regional 
government to each Soprintendenza, though empirical evidence shows that, on average, 
Soprintendenze only manage to spend half the resources they obtain (Mignosa, 2005). Specific 
incentives to stimulate such activity do not enter into play;  Soprintendenze are not responsible for 
managing the budget;  and, indeed, the fact that the figures describing the budget of each 
Soprintendenza are not easily available (Mignosa, 2005) suggests the lack of consciousness at the 
regional level for the adoption of any incentive system. Moreover, financial resources are not 
assigned on grounds of past performance. All things being equal, financial constraints are likely to 
be less severe for PC activities because, as tools of regulatory activity, their direct spending is less 
crucial. 
At the same time, finding out whether AC is more important than PC for gaining prestige and 
reputation among specialists is worthwhile. In both cases, research is involved but in AC the 
restored building or the archaeological excavation is a testimony to the expertise of the 
Soprintendenza’s specialists. Moreover, these specialists have direct interest in any AC activity 
that offers scope for new discoveries and historical interpretation in their field of expertise, which 
would allow them to gain professional prestige. Such expertise also tends to prevail when 
discoveries take place by chance, for instance, during the public construction of a road. The 
interest of the Soprintendenza’s experts may lead to the work being suspended, i.e. to use a 
regulatory tool, to allow specialists to investigate the discovery, use their findings for scientific 
work, and enhance their reputations. It might be argued that it is in society’s interest to promote 
knowledge and, therefore, that such procedure is in line with society’s welfare. This is not 
necessarily the case or, at least, how the decision-making process works in practice does not allow 
for assessing its relationship with society’s welfare. In fact, the decisions made by the 
Soprintendenza are usually not evaluated using the criterion of opportunity cost, nor are there 
institutional forms for representing local preferences; as a consequence, the informational 
advantage enjoyed by the experts drives decisions. The same argument applies as far as the 
strength of the regulation put into practice is concerned: to what extent the owners of designated 
buildings should be imposed restrictions on their use and appearance or the way conservation is 
carried out are open questions and depend crucially on the discretionary powers of the 
Soprintendenza. No strong evidence exists to assess whether the demand for public intervention is 
more or less effective in AC than in PC. In the latter, a strong individual component has to be 
taken into account: authorization, permission, demolition and constraints are divisible in the sense 
that their benefits and costs affect activities relating to both private and public owned heritage, 
thus causing an accountability problem. Soprintendenza’s performance is likely to be monitored 
by interested parties (individuals as well as public and private institutions), and delays or poor 
performance are likely to give rise to some form of protest. While such monitoring is not coupled 
with specific incentives (such as financial rewards or career benefits) designed by the regional 
government to stimulate a Soprintendenza’s performance (as measured by, for example, the length 
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of bureaucratic procedures and complaints from the public), it is likely to be effective whenever 
individual bureaucratic responsibility is involved, the concept of bureaucratic risk aversion  
offering an useful explanatory framework (Mazza and Rizzo, 2000). As previously mentioned, 
Soprintendenze are liable for any damage to heritage due to their action (or inaction) with regard to 
any third-party work or activity. Public concern may thus provide an incentive to concentrate 
attention on PC activities, allocating available resources (such as personnel) to those activities 
subject to stronger external control. 
On the other hand, the role of public opinion seems to be less relevant whenever the costs and 
benefits of a public good rather than a private one are involved. The public is interested in 
monitoring the Soprintendenze’s activity because of its impact on the local economy and on the 
conservation of local artistic patrimony. Though the role of the public is important because of the 
close relationship between heritage and local identity, its effectiveness on the decision-making 
process does not seem evident. Indeed, as it was stressed before, the fact that conservation is 
devolved to the regional government does not in itself guarantee that local preferences are 
adequately represented. One possible explanation lies in the fact that the accountability of regional 
government in Sicily has been very low: lack of real fiscal autonomy coupled with a proportional 
political system has so far implied a very low degree of political accountability (only in 2001 the 
voting system changed with the regional governor being elected by voters). The lack of 
institutional forms for representing local opinion in the decision-making process is likely to limit 
the beneficial impact of devolution. Nor is Soprintendenze performance adequately monitored at 
the regional level. As mentioned above, no evidence emerges that an incentive system exists to 
induce Soprintendenze to fulfill government objectives, however they are defined. As a 
consequence, conservation would seem to be mainly driven by objectives and preferences of the 
specialists and experts within the Soprintendenze, without any effective public opinion control. 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
1. Methodological issues in efficiency measure 
The theoretical literature on efficiency of production originates with the work of Koopmans 
(1951), Debreu (1951), and Shephard (1953). The first attempt to estimate efficiency has been 
made by Farrell (1957) and, then, studied in depth by Charnes et al. (1978). Following the seminal 
work by Farrell (1957), the concept of economic efficiency has been articulated into three types: 
technical, allocative and scale efficiency. Technical efficiency measures the firm’s ability to use 
the available technology in the most effective way. Allocative efficiency depends on prices and 
measures the firm’s ability to make optimal decisions on product mix and resource allocation. 
Combining measures of technical and allocative efficiency yields a measure of economic 
efficiency. Scale efficiency measures the optimality of the firm’s size. 
As a nonparametric approach, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (Fried et al., 2008) is used to 
derive technical and scale efficiency. DEA method can be applied using either output-based or 
input-based approach, depending on whether input or output distance function is used. 
Surprisingly, DEA has been applied to measure the efficiency of art organizations, showing a great 
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degree of flexibility, just in the last ten years. Luksetich and Nold Hughes (1997) investigate, by 
means of DEA and regression analysis, the efficiency and its determinants of funding activities of 
a sample of symphonic orchestras in the United States. The efficiency of religious organizations 
has been studied by Zaleski and Zech (1997). They apply DEA methodology to the U.S. Catholic 
Church to examine the relative shortage of priests. Finally, two contributions focus on the 
efficiency analysis of museums. Pignataro and Zanola (2001) analyze the efficiency levels of 
museums located in two very different Italian regions (Sicily and Piedmont), whereas Basso and 
Funari (2004) focus on many public Italian museums computing DEA efficiency levels and 
decomposing the efficiency scores into pure technical and scale components. 
In general terms a DEA input-oriented efficiency score iθ  is calculated for each DMU  
solving the following program for i=1,…., n (CRS constant  return to scale case): 
0                      
0                      
0        subject to
              Min
 ,
≥
≥−
≥−
λ
λ
λ
θθλ
Xxθ
Y-y
ii
i
ii
      (1) 
where ix and iy are respectively the input and output of i-th DMU ; X is the matrix of input and 
Y is the matrix of output of the sample; λ is a 1  ×n vector of constant.  
The model (1) can be modified to account for VRS (variable return to scale) by adding the 
convexity constraint: 1' =λI . 
In this paper, we use DEA method to estimate input-based technical and scale efficiency. The 
main focus of the study is on the analysis of input-based technical efficiency under variable returns 
to scale (VRS). However, we also report the technical efficiency scores computed under constant 
return to scale (CRS).  
Simar and Wilson (2000) clarify that traditional DEA methods yields biased estimates of 
efficiency. Based on homogeneous bootstrap procedure for DEA estimators, proposed by Simar 
and Wilson (1998), the paper estimates the bias and the confidence intervals of the input-based 
technical efficiency with VRS.11 Whereas DEA methods have been widely applied, most 
researchers have largely turned a blind eye to the statistical properties of the estimators. Ignoring 
the statistical noise in the estimation can lead to biased DEA estimates and misleading results 
because all the deviations from the frontier are considered inefficient. Simar and Wilson (2000) 
argue that bootstrap is the most currently feasible method to establish the statistical property of 
DEA estimators. Thus we apply homogeneous bootstrap procedure to correct the bias in DEA 
estimators and to construct their confidence intervals.  
The model [1] incorporates only discretionary inputs and does not take into account the 
presence of environmental variables or factors, also known as non-discretionary inputs, on 
performance. In this case, the most appropriate approach to use is the so-called two-stage 
analysis.12 This technique uses the inefficiency estimates as a dependent variable in the second 
stage of the analysis to investigate the influence of environmental variables on performance. 
                                                
11
 Estimates have been obtained using the package FEAR 1.1, developed by Wilson (2007). 
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Recent literature on two-stage estimation approach shows that the estimates are biased because of 
serial correlation of efficiency scores and suggests to apply semi-parametric two-stage technique 
to perform an estimation on non-discretionary inputs.  
To correct for bias in the estimates, we employ the following algorithm that replicates Simar 
and Wilson (2007)’s Algorithm 2.  The computation of the efficiency score that solves problem [1] 
is then considered as an estimate iθˆ  of  the efficiency score iθ . The maximum likelihood is used 
in the truncate regression of iθˆ on iz obtaining the maximum likelihood estimates βˆ  and εσˆ of β  
and εσ . Then, compute a L1 bootstrap estimates of β  and εσ with the following steps: 
a) for each DMU i=1, ….., n, we compute iε  from )ˆ,0( εσN with left truncation at 
)ˆ1( ii zβ− ; 
b) compute iii z εβθ += ˆ* ; 
c) employ a data set of pseudo data ii xx =* and **
i
i
ii yy θ
θ
=
 
d) estimate *ˆiθ  using *ix  and *iy  
We obtain  a n set of bootstrap estimate { } 1 1*ˆ Ljii ==Ψ θ  
For each i=1,…., n compute the bias-corrected estimator *ˆˆiθ  using iΨ and iθˆ as follows:  
iii SABI ˆˆ
ˆ
ˆ **
−= θθ , where iSABI ˆ is the bootstrap estimator of bias obtained as Simar and Wilson 
(1998). Use the method of maximum likelihood to estimate the truncated regression of *
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
iθ on iz  to 
provide an estimate βˆˆ  of β  and an estimate σˆˆ  on εσˆ . 
Loop over the next three steps L2 times to obtain a set of bootstrap estimate { } 21*ˆ Lsii ==Φ θ  
a) for each DMU i=1, ….., n, we compute iε  from )ˆˆ,0( εσN with left truncation at 
)ˆˆ1( ii zβ− ; 
b) again for each DMU i=1, ….., n, compute iii z εβθ += ˆˆ** ; 
c) maximum likelihood is used in the truncate regression of iθˆˆ on iz to obtain an estimate 
*
ˆ
ˆβ  of β  and an estimate *ˆσˆ  on εσˆ . 
Finally, we use the bootstrap values in iΦ and the original estimates βˆˆ  and σˆˆ to construct 
estimated confidence intervals for each element of β  and εσˆ . 
In the following analysis, we employ different techniques in the two-stage analysis of the 
determinants of Soprintendenze’s performance in order to compare parametric to semi-parametric 
estimation approach.  
                                                                                                                                 
12
 For a recent survey of different approach see Cordero-Ferrera et al. (2008). 
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2. Technical efficiency estimate 
The application of DEA to estimate the productivity of a Decision-Making Unit (DMU) calls for 
some steps to follow. Firstly, we define the production set in order to specify all the feasible 
combinations of input and output. Consequently, we make some standard assumptions on the 
production set.13 Following the contribution of Finocchiaro Castro and Rizzo (2009), we study a 
production function of Soprintendenze given by 1 input – personnel - and 2 outputs - expenditure 
(AC) and weighted administrative actions (PC).14 The PC data refer to the number of 
administrative actions, produced by each Soprintendenza as listed in the Official Regional 
Registry, weighted to take into account the differences in the technical and the administrative 
difficulty faced in implementing each type of the actions listed.15 The AC data refer to the 
expenditures (i.e. payments) of Soprintendenze (at 2000 fixed price).   
Data on the nine Sicilian Soprintendenze come from official Regional sources and refer to the 
period 1993-2005. Thus, our sample is a balanced panel data with 117 observations.  Table 1 
shows the descriptive statistics of variables employed.  
 
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics on input and output (cross-sectional - time-series distribution)  
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
overall 236.34 109.36 62.00 510.00 N =     117 
between  107.79 79.92 437.15 n =       9 input 
PERSONNEL 
 
within  39.28 104.19 316.50 T =      13 
overall 6567.25 3442.81 1407.81 19685.29 N =     117 
between  2990.74 2623.13 12566.51 n =       9 AC 
within  1958.00 583.01 13686.03 T =      13 
overall 317.09 455.58 11.43 3863.40 N =     117 
between  186.24 103.32 636.78 n =       9 
output 
PC 
within  420.06 296.29 3543.71 T =      13 
Source: our computation on data of the Official Registry of Regione Siciliana. 
 
The use of panel data in DEA model is widely discussed in the literature.16 Among the several 
possible ways to deal with panel data in efficiency DEA models, we have chosen to treat the panel 
                                                
13
 The standard assumptions are a) production set is convex and closed; b) production requires the use of 
inputs and both inputs and outputs are strongly disposable; c) observed set of inputs and outputs results 
from independent draws from a probability density function with bounded support over the production set; 
d) density function is strictly positive for all points along the frontier; e) any point along the frontier the 
density is continuous in any direction toward the interior of the production set (Färe et al, 1985). 
14
 Kneip et al. (1998) show that the rate of convergence of Farrell’s estimate efficiency score depends on the 
number of input and output. In particular, the choice of a simple estimation model makes it possible to 
derive more consistent estimates of efficiency scores. 
15
 Weights (ranging from 1 to 5) have been assigned on the grounds of a questionnaire submitted to some 
experts employed by both the Soprintendenze and the Assessorato ai BB.CC. e P.I. (Sicilian Region 
Department of Arts and Education) to take into account the differences in the technical and the 
administrative difficulty to implement the actions listed. For further details, see Finocchiaro and Rizzo 
(2009). 
16 The traditional approach to the analysis of efficiency DEA models with panel data is the so-called  
“window analysis”, converting a panel into an overlapping sequence of windows which are then treated as 
separate cross-sections. However the choice of windows can lead to bias in estimates. An alternative way is 
to employ the Malmquist index of productivity change. Another possibility is to treat the panel as a single 
cross-section and pool the observations. In this case, each observation being considered as an independent 
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as a single cross-section and pool the data, given the slow convergence rates of DEA estimator. 
This choice is also based on the hypothesis that the conservation activity in Sicily is not affected 
by relevant technological changes. Consequently, efficiency estimates reflect relative DMU’s 
performance to the invariant technology.17 Finally, we apply the inspection technique developed 
by Wilson (1993) to control for possible effect of outliers on efficiency estimate. The results show 
no evidence of any outlier’s effects on the estimate.  
Tables 2 reports the estimates of the mean efficiency scores, measured with Farrell (1957) 
efficiency definition, for each DMU. Following Simar and Wilson (1998), we implement the 
homogeneous bootstrap procedure to correct the bias in DEA estimators and obtain their 
confidence intervals.18 
 
Table 2 – Efficiency estimate – mean value for each Soprintendenza 
Pure technical efficiency (VRS - input oriented)  
Total technical efficiency  
(CRS - input oriented) 
SOPRINTENDENZE 
 Eff. Score 
mean value 
Eff. Bias corr 
- mean value 
Bias  - mean 
value 
Lower bound  
- mean value 
Upper Bound  
- mean value 
Eff. Score - mean value 
DMU_1 0.378 0.348 0.029 0.320 0.371 0.362 
DMU_2 0.717 0.669 0.048 0.626 0.706 0.703 
DMU_3 0.467 0.421 0.046 0.383 0.458 0.444 
DMU_4 0.495 0.449 0.046 0.405 0.488 0.345 
DMU_5 0.492 0.452 0.040 0.413 0.484 0.466 
DMU_6 0.568 0.466 0.102 0.395 0.555 0.502 
DMU_7 0.807 0.732 0.075 0.667 0.796 0.639 
DMU_8 0.602 0.527 0.075 0.474 0.589 0.590 
DMU_9 0.445 0.414 0.031 0.384 0.439 0.436 
All sample 0.552 0.498 0.055 0.452 0.543 0.499 
Mean scale efficiency 0.903 
Mean scale inefficiency 0.097 
Source: our computation on data of the Official Registry of Regione Siciliana. 
Column 2 provides the mean values of DEA efficiency scores, columns 3 and 4 provide the 
bias-corrected efficiency scores and the bootstrap bias estimates, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 
provide the two boundaries of 95% confidence intervals for the bias- corrected efficiency scores. 
Finally, column 7 reports efficiency scores under CRS. Table 2 shows a poor efficiency level for 
the whole sample. The bias-corrected efficiency estimates range from 0.348 to 0.732, with an 
                                                                                                                                 
one, a single frontier is computed and the relative efficiency of each DMU in each period is calculated. 
Estache et al. (2004) observe that pooling data is a special case of “window analysis” with the advantage of 
being a non discretionary choice of windows. We follow the latter approach in order to increase the 
estimation power of the model.  
17 
 We used the Malmquist Index to check for increases in the productivity of DMUs. Our data show that 
productivity has not significantly changed during the observation period. 
18 The confidence intervals and the bias-corrected efficiency scores have been estimated using the 
homogeneous bootstrap procedure with 2,000 bootstrap draws as described by  Simar and Wilson (1998). 
We also assume the independence between technical inefficiency and output levels as well as the mix of 
inputs that are produced,  
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average value of 0.498. Thus, our results indicate that, on average, each Soprintendenza can reduce 
its input proportionally by 50.2 percent without reducing output, assuming that no technological 
change has taken place in the observation period. Table 2 shows also that the portion of scale 
inefficiency (i.e. the penalty suffered when assuming CRS instead of VRS) is quite small (0.097).  
The choice between CRS and VRS depends crucially on various factors related to the context 
and scope of the analysis.19  
Figure 1 plots the mean and variance of the bias-corrected efficiency estimates for each year of 
observation.20 The mean is measured on the left vertical axis, while variance is measured on the 
right vertical axis. Data show a low variability in the mean of the bias-corrected efficiency scores 
over the sample period and, overall, a quite low performance at year level. The highest efficiency 
scores are 2001 (0.600), 2003 (0.579), and 2004 (0.576). It has to be noted that there is no 
evidence of a time trend in the average efficiency levels. Thus, we find a quite small dispersion of 
productivity across Soprintendenze.  
 
Figure 1 – Mean and variance of efficiency estimate across Soprintendenze by year 
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Source: our computation on data of the Official Registry of Regione Siciliana. 
 
 
Figure 2 describes the scatter plot of sample observations ordered by the bias-corrected 
efficiency score. The 95% confidence intervals for each DMU are represented by the lower and the 
upper bound, and original efficiencies are indicated by the circle. It is evident that the original 
efficiencies are not included in the confidence interval. This result clearly reflects the theory 
behind the construction of these intervals (Simar and Wilson, 1998).  
                                                
19
 To check for constant returns to scale we estimate the correlation between CRS efficiency scores and 
Soprintendenze size measured with variables related to the operating scale such as personnel  (correlation, 
0.294) and population served (correlation, 0.074). In principle the low correlation values justify the use of 
the VRS. In addition, we calculated the correlation between CRS and VRS that turned out to be very high 
(0.918).  
20
 Solid line shows mean efficiency, measured on the left vertical axis, dashed line shows variance of 
estimated efficiency, measured on the right vertical axis.  
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The efficiency ranking of the original DMU efficiencies changes compared with the bias-
corrected efficiency ranking, although the difference is quite small. This suggests a relative low 
level of noise that appears in a little bias correction downward. The relative smaller confidence 
intervals and minor bias of VRS estimates imply that the results are relatively stable and suggest 
that other factors, such as environmental variables, could explain the sources of efficiency 
variations. This issue will be addressed in the following section. 
 
Figure 2 - Confidence intervals and point estimates for VRS 
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3. The empirical analysis of the determinants of performance in heritage 
conservation 
The standard DEA model incorporates only discretionary inputs, whose quantities can be varied at 
DMU’s need, to investigate the determinants of performance and do not take into account the 
presence of environmental variables or factors, also known as non-discretionary inputs. However, 
differences in the levels of non-discretionary inputs may play a relevant role in determining 
heterogeneity across DMU because non-discretionary and discretionary inputs jointly contribute to 
each DMU outputs.  
To investigate the determinants of the performance of Soprintendenze conservation activity, we 
consider economic as well as managerial variables21. The estimated models can be expressed by 
the following general formulation: 
iii zf εθ += )(                                        (2) 
                                                                                                                                 
 
21
 We do not include the stock of heritage as explanatory variable because the official available data on the 
amounts of heritage under the supervision of each Soprintendenza are rather obsolete and partial.  
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where iθ  is the efficiency scores that resulted from previous stage, iz  is a set of possible non-
discretionary inputs and iε  is a vector of error terms.  
The rationale for the selection of environmental variables that can affect the level of efficiency 
of each Soprintendenza is based on various considerations. First, data availability influences the 
selection of variables; second, almost all the institutional characteristics of the environment in 
which each Soprintendenza usually operates should be included in the analysis.  
As far as the economic variables are concerned, supply and demand variables are used. 
Looking at the supply-side and considering that Soprintendenze’s outputs are only partially 
affected by environmental factors and by the geographical features of the area under control, we 
believe that the only variable affecting the cost of production is the size of each province. Thus, 
being heritage scattered in the Provincial territory, the size of the area, expressed in squared Kms 
(SIZE), ceteris paribus, is likely to affect negatively the cost of producing both AC and PC 
activities.  
In addition, allocations can also be a proxy for the size of each Soprintendenza. This is not to 
say that greater allocation necessarily implies greater heritage22, but only that the greater the size 
of the budget the greater the scope of Soprintendenza activity. However, in our analysis the use of 
such a variable is not advisable because the efficiency scores, i.e. the dependent variable, have 
been calculated using the expenditures that are strongly correlated with allocations. 
Looking at the demand, it would be useful to use per capita cultural spending as a proxy for the 
demand for cultural activities. This variable would give also a measure of cultural environment 
and, therefore, it might be able to represent the interest of the local community for heritage 
conservation. So far, we have not found reliable data of per capita cultural spending at provincial 
level for the entire period of observation. For this reason, income per capita is used as a proxy for 
the demand of conservation (INCOME) on the assumption that higher income per capita implies 
higher levels of economic activity and, ceteris paribus, a more dynamic private construction 
sector. As a consequence,  increases in building and restoration activities call for higher demand of 
services supplied by Soprintendenze. However, income per capita is also a proxy for the socio-
economic status of population such as, for instance, education which, in turns, positively affects 
the demand for heritage. To control for the effect of education, we add the variable EDU obtained 
computing the number of graduates on thousand of inhabitants.  
Furthermore, it has to be noted that the areas under the competence of Soprintendenze in which 
the concentration of historical buildings is higher represent one of the most relevant source of 
demand of services provided by Soprintendenza, being a significant portion of its activity 
represented by architectonical and historical constraints. Thus, we use the registered estimate of 
the number of properties built before 1919 sited in the area of each Soprintendenza’s competence 
(OLD_B) to capture the abovementioned effect.  
As well as the environmental factors, the characteristics of cultural managers can affect the 
efficiency of Soprintendenze. In particular, we include into the analysis a measure of the length of 
                                                
22
 Guccio and Mazza (2005) point out that socio-political variables affect allocations.  
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the appointment and of the field of specialization of Soprintendenti (e.g. architect, archaeologist, 
art historian). 23   
The first managerial variable we deal with is the seniority of Soprintendenti (SENIORITY), 
i.e. the length of appointment of Soprintendenti in monthly terms24. The interpretation of the 
impact of this variable is not straightforward. On the one hand, a long tenure implies more 
experience and, thus, a positive effect on efficiency; on the other hand, from a public choice 
perspective, longer tenure would imply more powerful bureaucrats, who would have a greater 
bargaining power to extract resources from the political decision-maker and would be less 
accountable. In this case, we may observe a negative impact on efficiency. Finally, a variable 
representing the expertise of each Soprintendente can be used to investigate whether a change in 
the field of specialization of each Soprintendente might affect the efficiency scores. Rizzo (2002) 
argues that cultural managers may drive Soprintendenza’s activities on specific conservation issues 
according to their own field of interest, showing almost any concerns of efficiency. For this 
purpose, we introduce a dummy to control for change of the field of specialization when a new 
Soprintendente is appointed (EXPERTISE). Table 3 describes the variables employed in the 
analysis and Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 3. Variables employed 
Dependent Variable 
EFFICIENCY Efficiency scores (VRS) 
Explanatory Variables 
SIZE Size of the area of each Province i=1,…,9 (in millions of  squared Kms) 
EDU Number of graduates on 1,000 inhabitants in each Province i=1,…,9 in each year j=1,…,13  
INCOME Per capita income in each Province i=1,…,9 (in thousands) 
OLD_B  Number of properties built before 1919 in Province i=1,…,9 (in thousands) 
SENIORITY Length of appointment of each Soprintendente measured in months 
EXPERTISE Dummy for the changes in expertise of Soprintendente (Dummy=1 when a change takes place) 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics. 
                                                
23
 Soprintendente is the Provincial Director for Culture (Rizzo and Towse, 2002). 
24
 To take into account for possible endogeneity we introduce a lagged variable. 
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Source: our computation of data of the Official Registry of Regione Siciliana. 
 
In two-stage approach, researchers usually adopt censored regression techniques (Tobit) or, in 
a few cases, OLS estimates to take into account the censored nature of dependent variable. The 
most recent literature shows that the estimates are biased because of serial correlation of efficiency 
scores and suggests to apply semi-parametric two-stage technique to estimate efficiency scores 
using non-discretionary inputs (Simar and Wilson, 2007). 
Thus, we run an OLS, Tobit, truncated regression with and without a double bootstrap 
estimation on efficiency scores25. According to Simar and Wilson (2007) the truncated regression 
model provides better statistical inference than the Tobit and OLS regression models but, at the 
same time, the double bootstrap estimation provides the most robust check26.  
The estimated coefficients show quite similar values confirming the robustness of our empirical 
analysis. However, it has to be noted that our investigation does not aim at providing a punctual 
estimate of the marginal effects on performance of non-discretionary inputs but only average 
effects. Thus, the following comments refer to an overview of the sign of the variables employed. 
Looking at the supply side, we notice that the variable SIZE is significant, showing that the 
DMU’s performance is affected by specific dimension of the area in which the DMU operates. The 
negative sign seems to indicate that, being heritage scattered in the Provincial territory, the 
dimension of the area under control, ceteris paribus, affects negatively the cost of producing both 
AC and PC activities. Moving to the demand-side of the production process, our results show that 
the size of the demand positively affects the efficiency scores. The variables INCOME and 
OLD_B are always significant with positive sign. This confirms that the demand exerts a positive 
effect on efficiency because of the stimulus of the heritage owners on DMUs performance 
(Finocchiaro Castro and Rizzo, 2009). In contrast, the variable EDU does not significantly affect 
the productivity level of Soprintendenze.  
Finally, none of the managerial variables (SENIORITY and EXPERTISE) is significant in any 
estimated model. A possible explanation lies on the above mentioned limited operational autonomy 
of Soprintendenti as far as the personnel and management of financial resources are concerned. 
Hence, the efficiency scores of the Sicilian Soprintendenze seem to be affected by the demand and 
supply variables only. 
 
                                                
25
 See section 4.1. 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
EFFICIENCY 0.55 0.21 0.23 1 
SIZE 2.86 0.95 1.61 4.99 
EDU 53.86 13.79 28.41 90.25 
INCOME 11.68 2.47 7.08 19.69 
OLD_B 23.37 14.14 9.88 52.33 
SENIORITY 80.54 86.76 12.00 324.00 
EXPERTISE 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 
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Table 5. OLS, Censored and Truncated estimates for Efficiency scores (VRS)   
 
Independent variable: Efficiency scores (VRS input oriented) 
Functional form: linear 
Estimation range: 1993 – 2005 
Observation: 117 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS  
regression 
Tobit  
regression 
Truncated 
regression 
Truncated 
regression with 
double 
bootstrap 
Variable  
EFFICIENCY EFFICIENCY EFFICIENCY EFFICIENCY 
0.5604*** 0.5447*** 0.6098*** 0.6183*** 
Constant 
(0.1672) (0.1501) (0.1599) (0.1680) 
-0.1551** -0.1592** -0.1550*** -0.2543*** 
SIZE 
(0.0627) (0.0640) (0.0597) (0.0614) 
-0.0080* -0.0087 -0.0069 -0.0057 
EDU 
(0.0043) (0.0051) (0.0042) (0.0044) 
0.0554** 0.0613*** 0.0442* 0.0461* 
INCOME 
(0.0227) (0.0174) (0.0240) (0.0245) 
0.0102*** 0.0104** 0.0099*** 0.0097*** 
OLD_B 
(0.0037) (0.0043) (0.0036) (0.0037) 
-0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 
SENIORITY 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
0.0093 -0.0009 0.0416 0.0543 
EXPERTISE 
(0.0436) (0.0541) (0.0462) (0.0493) 
Observation  117 117 110 110 
Fixed effect no no no no 
R-squared 0.3236 - - - 
F - test  6.26*** - - - 
LR χ2 - χ2(6)= 31.13*** - - 
Wald χ2 -  χ
2(6)= 28.91*** 
- 
 
Notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, 
respectively. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we focused on the regulation of heritage conservation and its relevant effects on the 
allocation of resources. Among the several regulation models of heritage conservation, we 
considered the Sicilian model of heritage authorities as a case study. Sicily offers an interesting 
example of devolution and the size and importance of its heritage is such that conservation policy 
is a significant area of activity for  the Regional Government.  
We contributed to the current literature on the empirical analysis of regulation in the field of 
heritage conservation in two directions. First, we apply Simar and Wilson (1998) homogeneous  
bootstrap procedure on a production function, based on the activities carried out by heritage 
authorities, to correct the bias in DEA estimates and establish their confidence interval. This new 
procedure sheds some light on the effects of statistical noise on DEA estimates, often ignored by 
most of the researchers in the field of efficiency analysis.  
                                                                                                                                 
26 Given that our sample is a balanced panel we check for panel effect. Breusch-Pagan test rejects the 
hypothesis of random effects.  
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Second, we investigated, from both a theoretical and empirical point of view, the determinants 
of efficiency estimates using economic and managerial variables to distinguish non-discretionary 
from discretionary inputs. Following the most recent literature on statistical inference in 
nonparametric DEA models (Simar and Wilson, 2007), we apply a two-stage semi-parametric 
estimate to explain the sources of efficiency variations of Heritage Authorities. To the best of our 
knowledge this is the first paper applying this new techniques to the field of heritage conservation. 
The results shown, on average, a poor efficiency level for the sample that did not crucially 
depend on the assumption of VRS instead of CRS. We also reported a slight variability in 
efficiency scores and, overall, a quite low performance at year level. The patterns of efficiency 
levels turned out to be clearly non-increasing. This result recalls the well-known Baumol’s disease 
effect in the field of heritage conservation (Baumol and Bowen, 1966). 
We investigated the determinants of Soprintendenze’s efficiency scores applying on economic 
and managerial variables a double bootstrap procedure (Simar and Wilson, 2007).  
 Our results shown that the efficiency scores of the Sicilian Soprintendenze seem to be affected 
by demand and supply variables only, whereas the variables related to the organizational features 
of heritage authorities do not play any effect.  
Tentative policy implications stemming from our analysis stress the positive role on efficiency 
exerted by incentives. As shown by Finocchiaro Castro and Rizzo (2009), given the institutional 
features of the Sicilian heritage organizational structure, the only stimulus depends mainly on 
demand whereas almost no incentives are built in the decision–making process. Thus, a greater 
operational autonomy of Soprintendenti combined with a systematic assessment of their 
performance might introduce positive incentives toward efficiency.   
Finally, the analysis shows some room for reshaping the territorial design of Soprintendenze 
since the coincidence with the provincial area seems not justified by any sound economic reason 
and bears negative effects on the costs of production.  
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